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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

LEW ISON,

:••-,

Case No. 991030-CA

Defendant/Appellant,

INTRODUCTION
In its brief, the State misstates the issues presented on appeal and misapplies the
law. Under modern rules of evidence, the administrative law judge's decision ("ALJ")
was admissible as evidence supporting Mr. Ison's innocence. Further, the prosecutor's
comments on Mr. Ison's failure to call a pivotal witness without obtaining a required
advance ruling misled the jury and communicated that Mr. Ison could not support his
defense. The trial judge then misinformed the jury on the law on Mr. Ison's contractual
obligations and failed to give Mr. Ison an opportunity to object to this instruction as
required under state constitutional and case law. Moreover, because Mr. Ison claims his
defense counsel was ineffective, he properly challenges for the first time on appeal the
procedures relating to the erroneous instruction and his right to presence. Defense
counsel's failure to object to these errors altered the jury's verdict because each of them
directly addressed Mr. Ison's innocence. The trial transcript fiirther supports that, in any

event, Mr. Ison acted in good faith and without any criminal intent. Finally, defense
counsel harmed Mr. Ison by not objecting to an unlawful restitution award that resulted
in Mr. Ison paying almost $1,300 in restitution.

L

DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO ADMIT
EVIDENCE THAT EXONERATED MR. ISON, OBJECT
TO I N A D M I S S I B L E
EVIDENCE
THAT
COMMUNICATED MR. ISON'S GUILT, AND ALERT
THE TRIAL JUDGE THAT HE HAD MISINFORMED
THE JURY ON THE LAW, RESULTED IN THE JURY'S
GUILTY VERDICTS

Defense counsel's numerous missteps directly led to Mr. Ison's convictions.
Defense counsel failed to present admissible evidence that supported Mr. Ison's
innocence. Counsel also failed to object to the prosecutor's improper comments on Mr.
Ison's failure to present evidence. The record further establishes that defense counsel
consented to the trial judge misinforming the jury about Mr. Ison's contractual duties
which formed the basis for the charges. Moreover, the Utah Constitution and established
law required the trial judge to discuss the jury's question about the purchase agreement
in Mr. Ison's presence. Because each of these deficiencies directly addressed Mr. Ison's
guilt or innocence, defense counsel's failings resulted in the jury's guilty verdicts. At the
very least, the cumulative effect of these errors deprived Mr. Ison of a fair trial.

2

A.

Defense Counsel Failed to Present Admissible
Evidence that Established Mr. Ison's
Innocence

Well-established law conclusively shows that under modern rules of evidence the
ALJ's decision was admissible to support Mr. Ison's innocence. The State, instead,
applies an anachronistic approach to evidentiary questions. In fact, the ALJ's decision
was presumptively admissible and the State presents no reasons to rebut that
presumption. The State's reliance on collateral estoppel is irrelevant to this appeal and
simply diverts this Court's attention from defense counsel's failure to present admissible
evidence that establishes Mr. Ison's innocence.
ALJ decisions are admissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C). Because
the framers of the Utah Rules of Evidence sought uniformity with the federal rules, this
Court applies the federal courts' construction of the rules of evidence. State v. Webster.
2001 UT App 238,^[22 & n.l, 32 P.3d 976. Several federal courts of appeals have
upheld the "admissibility of findings of officials and agencies within the executive
branch" under rule 803(8)(C). Zeus Enterprises v. Alphin Aircraft, Inc.. 190 F.3d 238,
242 (4th Cir. 1998). Agency officials' reports are admissible because public officials
presumably perform their duties reliably, it is wasteful to bring public officials to court,
and reports are more reliable than public officials' often faulty memories:
[Rule 803(8)(C)] is based upon the assumption that
public officers will perform their duties, that they lack motive
to falsify, and that public inspection to which many such
records are subject will disclose inaccuracies. In addition the
3

disruptive effect of bringing public officials into court to testify
about matters that have generally been accurately reported and
recorded is avoided. Use of the record also serves the public
convenience by saving time and the expenditure of public
money. Moreover, the record is likely to be much more reliable
than the official's often hazy recollection.
Michael R. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence §803.8 at 398 (5 th Ed. 2001) (citing
Advisory Committee to Federal Rules and numerous other scholars) (footnotes omitted).
Based on this reasoning, several federal courts have specifically ruled that an
ALJ's decision following an investigative hearing is an admissible public record. Zeus ,
190 F.3d at 242; Henry v. Davtop Village, Inc., 42 F.3d 89, 96 (2nd Cir. 1994); In re
Paducah Towing Co.. 692 F.2d 412, 421 (6th Cir. 1982); Llovd v. American Export
Lines, Inc.. 580 F.2d 1179, 1182-83 (3 rd Cir. 1978). State courts have agreed that ALJ
decisions are admissible. Larsen v. Decker, 995 P.2d 281, 283-85 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000);
Leitingv.Mutha. 58 P.3d 1049, 1052-53 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002). The United States
Supreme Court has similarly ruled that conclusions "based on a factual investigation"
following an administrative hearing are admissible under Rule 803(8)(C). Beech
Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 170 (1988) (admitting ajudge advocate general's
report of an airplane accident, including its conclusions). In fact, in enacting Rule
803(8), the Advisory Committee noted that agency decisions following an investigative
hearing such as the one that occurred in this case enhance the reliability of the agency's
findings. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 803.8, at 390. In any event, the
ALJ's decision here certainly fits this Court's assessment of Rule 803(8)(C) that a public
4

"" ^ ^jmis^u^ w .IL.

made the report within the scope of his or

her duly. Slate ex reh W.S.. 939 P.2d 196, 200 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
Contrary to the State's characterizations, public records are presitiuptn cly
admissible under Rule 803(8)(O "The adi.iL,.*,:'/;
rule is assumed as a v ... ,

'

.i fiiblit in onl specified in the
^efficient negative factors to

indicate a lack i|i,l In is (worthiness. . . ." Zeus„ 190 1 .3d ai 2-11 utiscussing Advisory
Committee notes). "Rule 803(8)[(C)] Ms not a »iile of exclusion., but laihu is .• nih i'l
admissibility' as long as the public record meets iln: icijiinvmcnr. ut i,In" ink'
(quoting Fred Warren i5cn-..L
i

;

!;

vtdence 803(8): The Use oiTuH .

' Yiminal Cases, 21 Am. J. Trial Advnc 229. 232 (1997.

M

[t]he party opposing admission has the burden to establish unreliabilii \ "
H

State makes no attempt to argue u.M> .

Id

hus,
'•

he

trustworthy

Instead,, the SlaU. aiijue . tU i( flfr MJ's decision is not admissible under the
utllahTitl estoppel doctrine. State's Brief at 11-12. T Jnder that doctrine, parties need not
"relitigate issues that have been resolved in their favor" in a pru ;
Bvjlis. 911 P.2d 981. 984 (IJ tan I I. Ap| s, I 9w/, I w H I s* * •

/ *. r. .State v.
^.ever argued for collateral

estoppel urn in i, i Initialing I lie facts of his case. Rather, he cues well-established law
i' «i support his claim that the ALJ's decision was admissible evidence in supp
defense theory. The State's analysis ot collateral estoppel \> iiuppu.Mle to this claim.
'The State's remaining ol>|u In .n , io admitting the ALJ's decision are antiquated

5

and have been repudiated. The federal cases the State cites interpreted the former rules
of evidence long before the modern version of the federal rules were adopted in 1975.
State's Brief at 12-14; Utah Rules of Evidence at 642 (Preliminary Note) (2003). Under
contemporary rules of evidence, "Rule 803(8)[(C)] i s not a rule of exclusion, but rather
is a rule of admissibility' as long as the public record meets the requirements of the rule."
Zeus, 190 F.3d at 241 (quoting Bennett, 21 Am. J. Trial Advoc. at 232).
Moreover, Rule 803(8)(C) draws a distinction between judicial branch and agency
findings. Id at 242. In particular, the concern for jurors giving undue weight to a
judge's findings are less pronounced when dealing with ALJ findings as opposed to
judicial branch judges. Id. Further, the advantages of public officials presumably
fulfilling their duties reliably and without bias plus the convenience and efficiency of
admitting public reports provide strong policy support for admission under Rule
803(8)(C). Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence §803.8, at 398. Modern Rule of
Evidence 803(8)(C), thus, actually assists jurors rather than interfering with their factfinding role.
Given the admissibility of the ALJ's report, defense counsel unreatsonably failed
to offer this exculpatory evidence in support of the defense. State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d
937, 941 (Utah 1996). Likewise, because this report specifically addressed Mr. Ison's
conduct and completely exonerated him, defense counsel's conduct undermines the
jury's verdicts. State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 187 (Utah 1990). The State concedes

6

the decisive natiiri i • M 11 • . I i . I c T i •; i * 111 when it argues that the decision would unduly
iiiliuciin," tin: (tin,1 M deliberations. State's Brief at l"-!'

\though the State overvalues

ihr effect an ALJ's decision has on jurors, its concerns about I he mip.K.1 (Ins evident n
w ill have in this case implicitly acknowieuyt >
ALTs deu^wi, .
foiling to * *

CIILC,

Indeed, because the

defense counsel was ineffective for

femplin 805P.2dai 187.

Ik ,; Defense Counsel Further Prejudiced the Jury
By Failing to Object to the Prosecutor's
Comments on Mr. Ison's Failure to Call a
Pivotal But Unavailable Witness
' I he prosecutor's comments on the failure to call Allison Peru/ 10 icslih \ v >l.ih d
the missing witness rule because those comment

;•

_vn. Ison's

credibility. Rather, those i <111111n-111^ implied iliat Ms. Perez could not support Mr. Ison's
"liiiin-. llial Nt i ihrcatened to cancel the entire group booking. Because the prosecutor's
comments addressed improper matters and the prosecutoi .. .
ruling, defense counsel's failure to olv failure to objeel ahi» piv|i»dn ed (

*-' ">

:<

J

* ./e

*• i, dciense cuuiu.w* ~

\ > because, as the ad\ance ruling; requirement

MiggcsK, comments on the failure to call witnesses may irreparably prejudice JUMM "•«.
The State mistakenly argues tiuii i.;ie prosecuh n" - • omniem • merely suggested
that defendant's uvd;, ,
two witnesses -

'

..

his statements were contradicted by

States Brief a t . : . The prosecutor informed the jury,
7

"you've got the statement of Mr. Ison that somebody who didn't come and testify today
said, oh yeah we're going to cancel the entire group." R. 392: 621. Although the
prosecutor discussed Mr. Ison's "credibility," her comments implied that Mr. Ison did not
call Ms. Perez to testify because she would have denied threatening to cancel the cruise.
These comments were offered after the prosecutor twice instructed Mr. Ison during trial
not to mention Ms. Perez because "she was not here to testify." R. 392: 546, 580-81.
The prosecutor's comments further implied that Mr. Ison was lying because he
failed to present Ms. Perez to support his claims. IcL, Prosecutors may not raise "matters
the jury would not be justified in considering", including arguments that imply that a
criminal defendant must present evidence or call witnesses to prove the defense theory.
State v.Hopkins. 782 P.2d 475, 478 (Utah 1989); State v. Thompson. 776 P.2d 48, 50
(Utah 1989). Here, the prosecutor unmistakably argued that had Mr. Ison testified
truthfully, he would have presented Ms. Perez's testimony in support of him.
These comments exceeded the scope of proper closing arguments. Prosecutors
have latitude to "fully recount the evidence adduced and the reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom." Hopkins. 782 P.2d at 478 (emphasis added). But, rather than "fully"
addressing the evidence and drawing inferences, the prosecutor below focused on Mr.
Ison's failure to call Ms. Perez. Had the prosecutor truly limited her comments to Mr.
Ison's credibility she would have also explained that Ms. Perez was unavailable. Instead,
she faulted Mr. Ison for not presenting Ms. Perez as a witness and implied Ms. Perez

8

would not have suppori u i Mi. i.a «» k. < k I cnse
I lie Siati1 erroneously arpues that even if the prosecutor commented on Mr. Ison's
failure to call Ms. Perez, an objection would have simply i c^ . .1
instruction that would have remedied any re .utility pi

".^e's Brief at lo. niw

requirement to obtain .111 ad\ .11111 niliiii11 1 m (he failure to call a witness indicates that a
cur.il" v "tislfui I 'ini is not adequate. Advance rulings are necessary to prevent the
admission of reversible error caused by comments on the IUIIUM. I" 1 <M
i iiiv^-e«
"To avoid line.
11 error ink, 11:^ uiai. advance
permission f
t is needed even before counsel
makes an in*.. «, .... ..
^ witness argument. Arnold [v.
United States. 511 A.2d 399 416 (I).C. ]Q8Ml B\ so doing,
the trial court can "ensure that the foundational issues are
addressed before possibly improper inferences are suggested to
the jun ." Id. {emphasis in original) (quoting Thomas [v. United
States. 447 A.2J -2. 5S •'" ' ' »<>X2:|.
Harris v. United Stan>

ul (p.C. ±*J92*).

B) these practices the risk of

\ "'if.ifitiii (hi" entire trial bv improper argument as to the absence ot witnesses car
obviated."

.- States v, Blakemore, 4»v-' 1 _\; /

Requiring an advance ruling 1 s > 11 ( K:r i 111 >
anpK-pt

• ire to call witnesses,

~:
1 alive instruction will remedy
nder this reasoning, Thompson 's

^ o n acjvance rulings is meaningless. To avoid such an arsu:,, , Court should enforce the advance ruling requirunuil
441 4-U F v-

I liuniuek \. Jensen , l>50 P.2d

. .pp. - K
- ' - counsel had objected and the trial judge had admonished the jury,
9

a curative instruction would not have remedied the prosecutor's comments. Those
comments directly undermined Mr. Ison's defense that he truthfully represented that
NCL would withhold cruise documents if more funds were not forthcoming. This case
essentially involved a credibility contest between Mr. Ison and Mr. Mendez. But, Mr.
Mendez's testimony lacked persuasive value because he merely relied on NCL's records
and had little or no personal recollection of the facts. In close cases primarily involving
credibility, this Court has ruled that trial errors have a significant effect on the jury's
verdict. State v. Vail, 2002 UT App 176, ^17, 51 P.3d 1285 ; State v. lore, 801 P.2d 938,
942 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Because this case turned on Mr. Ison's veracity, "'the jurors
were probably influenced by the improper remarks in reaching their verdict.'11
Thompson. 776 P.2d at 50 (quoting State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 1986)).

C.

Defense Counsel Failed to Object to the Trial
Judge's Erroneous Jury Instruction that Mr,
Ison Was Legally Bound to Complete the
Cruise Under the Purchase Agreement

Defense counsel further provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the
trial judge's legally erroneous conclusion that Mr. Ison was bound under the purchase
agreement with Mr. Fiet. Initially, the State misconstrues the law on appellants
producing an adequate record. Because defense counsel failed to make a record in this
case, there is no record for Mr. Ison to produce. Similarly, the State's discussion of
recission and mediation is irrelevant. Because Mr. Fiet failed to satisfy a material
10

condition. M L IM>H h.j«l n«"«» dnl \ ( (vrform under the purchase agreement. Even if Mr.
1

Tfbrm, the record undisputably establishes that Mr, Ison acted in

good faith and believed that he was not bound to honor Mr. riei
Contran to the Staie ^ v-ijiin,. ... .
Brief at

,

on appc

-

^

:<\\nate record. State's

• n- ^-"isihilti} to ensure an adequate record

; ^ . Wagenman, 2003 Ul App :4e • 1 i n 4 ^l I .„ 184. I lir. thin

requires appellants to document support for all issues rai^\
transcripts and motions. State v. Penm.
IM. .1, . . .

s

--

.
•'Utah Ct. App. 1998).

Jailure to produce an adequate appellate record,

u claims dial defence counsel was ineffective for failing to obj^:

e

erroneous jury instruction and for failing to secure Mr hi HI \ nglil d • p' esem <:. i'hus,
Mr. Ison's claims center on deiense uiiinscFs lailuie In make an adequate record'1 of the
trial judge s eiron Slate v. Baker. 963 P.2d 801, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). This issue
" • I'II «i pperi ^ raised "for the first time on appeal if

a claim of ineffective assistant. • -I

counsel is raised [] even though, by reason of tftc eiuimc*
not raised below." State v. Looiin

*•

'

r

matter was

* J, *, /, J 6 P.3d 533. Were the

appc 11,ilt i'eu'i'l j HI •hletiiute, Mr. ison renews his Rule 23B motion to remand this case
for a hearing to supplement the record with evidence showing (Jul defense i • HHI '
consented to the erroneous jury instruct; .
Because

* Mi. hon in court.

-cd the inai \^>w ajur) infraction on appeal,

11

this appeal raises whether the trial judge correctly informed the jury that the purchase
agreement was binding on Mr. Ison. As a matter of black letter law, "[t]he unexcused
non-occurrence of a condition . . . prevents] performance of the duty from becoming
due." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 225 cmt. a (1981). As this Court has ruled,
the failure of a condition precedent ffrelieve[s] [parties] of [a] duty to perform." Grossen
v. DeWitt 1999 UT App 167,1J12 n.5, 982 P.2d 581. Under these undisputed principles,
Mr. Ison's discovery that Mr. Fiet failed to forward cruise payments relieved him of any
"duty" to assume responsibility for the group booking. IJL
Because Mr. Ison had no "duty to perform", the State's discussion of recission and
mediation are irrelevant to this appeal. The main questions in this case were whether Mr.
Ison: (1) devised a scheme to defraud; and, (2) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
misrepresented facts to further that scheme. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), (7)
(1999). Mr. Fiet's failure to forward deposit money defeats both of these elements.
First, because Mr. Fiet failed to satisfy a condition precedent, Mr. Ison was never legally
bound to assume responsibility for the group cruise. Grossen, 1999 UT App 167, ^[12
n.5, 982 P.2d 581. Thus, Mr. Ison truthfully informed passengers that he was not
contractually required to honor the arrangements with Aristocrat nor did he devise a
scheme to defraud. Although recission and mediation may have been applicable in a
civil suit with Mr. Fiet, they had no concern with Mr. Ison's dealings with passengers.
Second, even were Mr. Ison contractually bound to complete the group booking,

12

Mr Ison s actions piove thai lie lacked intent to defraud. Rather, Mr. Isonhad a wellloiiiuiaf

IN HIL"SI

belief that he had no legal obligation under the purchase agreement.

Immediately upon discovering the missing business records and cruise payments, Mi
Ison requested Mr
Fiet, deman.^..

T

. •:

ofthouse to an*1
.

-

*ount, contacted NCL and Mr.

n e t refused to cooperate, and sent a letter to Mr

f iel and spedfically explained that he would not assume responsibilitv lor the 11 IUM
Only after taking all of these steps, did Mr. Ison inform., passengers iliai he had no
contractual obligation to them and 'hai
As

IIICM

HIMM'

monr\ \\:\:^ needed.

extensive efforts demonstrate, Mr. Ison had a good faith, honest hehef

(tut IK- w Ji-, not contractually obligated to complete the group booking, i .h .
mistakenly faults Mr. Ison for failing to seek mediation and I'enss--

ison":* eliorts

to determine the shortages and ilie aim >nin passengers had paid conclusively establish
thai In" did li-if "Mention ,IL knowingly, or recklessly request passengers for more
'

t\ more detailed discussion of Mr. Ison's intent is liiuuueu in ^vvtu

11 i M • i. -o

The absence of a scheme and Mi. ison h ^ MM! I J I (I I I «>n- In \ t meant that he did not
~^~" .t fraudulent communis al u. ' "vl .•* nllieless, the trial judge's jury instruction that
under the purchase agreement misinformed jurors that Mr. I s< n i I u id
falsely represented his leual obligations ana, Liu.... ;;».. reason, defense counsel, not onl\ imreasi mabl\ ladi.nl li
failure direct!) iCMiilcd i«i >vb I M»II\ conviction.

•

hw \ :-rv

I ject to the instruction,, but that

D.

Defense Counsel's Mishandling of the Jury
Instruction Deprived Mr. Ison of His State
Constitutional and Legal Rights to Be Present
at Trial

Not only did defense counsel fail to correct the trial judge's misunderstanding of
the purchase agreement but his failure to present Mr. Ison in court violated Mr. Ison's
rights to be present at all stages of his trial. The State fails in its attempts to distinguish
State v. Lee, 585 P.2d 58 (Utah 1978), because that case remains sound constitutional
law which this Court must follow. Moreover, the defendant's waiver in Lee has no
application here because Mr. Ison claims ineffective assistance of counsel unlike the
claims in that case. In any event, the trial judge violated Rule of Criminal Procedure
17(m) because he failed to provide Mr. Ison an opportunity to object in court to the
erroneous instruction.
Despite the State's efforts to distinguish Lee, the State does not dispute that Lee
has never been overruled. State's Brief at 22. Utah law clearly provides that u[t]he
Court of Appeals simply cannot overrule the law as announced by the highest court in the
state

" Sentry Investigations v. Davis. 841 P.2d 732, 735 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

Because only the Utah Supreme Court can change its own precedent, this Court must
follow Lee. Id.
Further, the State fails to distinguish Lee. That case specifically cites article 1,
section 12 of the Utah Constitution as well as statutes and case law in holding that
"constitutionally and statutorily and case-wise . . . any communication between judge and
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jury should be in the presence of the accused, his counsel and the prosecutor." Lee, 585
P.2d at 58. The State's blanket statement that this holding is "dicta" ignores the plain
language of that decision.
The State also fails to distinguish Lee when it notes that the defendant there
affirmatively waived his right to presence by failing to object. State's Brief at 22. Here,
although defense counsel failed to object, Mr. Ison argues that this failure constituted
ineffective assistance. As explain in section IC above, Mr. Is<

•

».v; :> lallenged

counsel's effectiveness for the first time in this appeal. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, ^7,
36 P.3d 533. Any other conclusio?

ild deprive Mr. Ison of his right to counsel.

Lee's finding of harmlessness also has no application to this appeal because the
trial judge in this case erroneously instructed the jury on the law In Lee., the defendant
showed no harm because the trial judge correctly instructed the jury. 585 P.2d at 59. In
contrast, the trial judge below wrongly informed the jury that Mr. Ison was bound under
the purchase agreement. Because this erroneous instruction mistakenly informed ttu jury
that Mr. Ison fraudulently represented the facts, Mr. Ison suffered irreparable harm when
defense counsel failed to secure his right to presence in court where Mr. Ison could have
corrected the trial judge's error. •
Even if Lee did not establish a constitutional right to be present, the trial judge
failed to adhere to the procedures outlined in more recent cases. In both State v. Kozik,
688 P.2d 459, 460 (Utah 1984), and State v. Lucero , 866 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah Ct. App. 1993),
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the trial judges brought the defendants into the courtroom and gave them an
"opportunity" to object to the instruction. The trial judge failed to do so here. Instead,
he simply entered the jury question into the record and proceeded with jury deliberations
without presenting Mr. Ison in court. Thus, under either Lee, Kozik, or Lucero, the trial
judge deprived Mr. Ison of an opportunity to correct the trial judge's mistake.

E.

Defense Counsel's Cumulative Errors Require
Reversal

Should this Court not be persuaded that the errors listed above do not by
themselves require reversal, the cumulative effect of those errors denied him the right to
" a fair trial." State v. Young. 853 P.2d 327, 368 (Utah 1993). Each of defense
counsel's errors directly addressed Mr. Ison's guilt or innocence. In every instance,
defense counsel either failed to present exculpatory evidence or allowed the jury to hear
inadmissible misleading evidence of guilt. A new trial is necessary to secure Mr. Ison's
due process rights.

II.

THE RECORD ESTABLISHES THAT MR. ISON
TRUTHFULLY REPRESENTED THE SITUATION AND
HAD NO INTENT TO DEFRAUD ANYONE.

Even excusing defense counsel's ineffectiveness, Mr. Ison committed no crime
because he accurately described the need for more funds to the passengers. The trial
transcript shows that Mr. Ison acted without any criminal intent. Even the State concedes
16

that Mr. Ison presented a viable defense. State's Brief at 8. Because the evidence fails to
support that Mr. Ison had any criminal intent beyond any measure of reasonable doubt,
he requests this Court to reverse his convictions.
Despite the complicated nature of cruise group bookings, the record plainly shows
that Mr. Ison truthfully stated that Mr. Fiet failed to ffforward[]tf "some of the monies" to
NCL. Appellant's Brief; Addendum O. Mr. Lofthouse repeatedly testified that Mwe
could not show that [cruise payments] went to Norwegian Cruise Line." R. 390: 211.
Mr. Lofthouse clarified numerous times that cruise payments "did not make it" to NCL,
Aristocrat was "shy [of] paying" all cruise payments, and that there was "no way [cruise
payments] made it to NCL." R. 390: 205, 208, 210-13, 218. Indeed, even the State
concedes on appeal that Mr. Fiet "fail[ed] to ensure that the deposits entrusted to him
were properly transferred to NCL after [Mr. Ison] took over" Aristocrat. State's Brief at
34. Thus, this appeal raises the question of whether Mr. Ison intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly misrepresented Mr. Fiet's conduct in furtherance of a scheme to defraud

11 tali

Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), (7) (1999).
Mr. Ison accurately depicted that Mr. Fiet failed to "forwardf]" cruise payments
because Mr. Fiet was responsible in several ways for the missing funds. First, Maria
Souza testified that during the first half of 1995 she transferred money out of the group
cruise account for Mr. Fiet's "previous debts as a result of a [bounced] check and one
credit card dispute" on otliei cruises totaling over $5,500. R. 391: 353. Ms. Souza was
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forced to transfer this money for debts on other cruises because Mr. Fiet refused to pay
the debts. IdL at 353, 358. Second, Ms. Souza testified further that Mr. Fiet bounced a
check that he issued three days before selling Aristocrat's assets to Mr. Ison in the
amount of $4,796. IcL at 352. In fact, Ms. Souza stated that at the time of the group
booking Mr. Fiet had a history of presenting bad checks to NCL and was having
"financial problems.1' IdL at 353-54. The State even stipulated at trial that Mr. Fiet failed
to forward, at least, $15,290 to NCL. IdL at 418. Thus, there appears to be additional
funds that Mr. Fiet failed to send to NCL. Third, Mr. Fiet could not recoup these losses
because he had discounted his prices so drastically that his commissions were inadequate
to cover other deficits. R. 390: 193-94.
Fourth, the record reveals that Mr. Fiet's poor business practices resulted in
additional money not being sent to NCL. In June of 1995, the Airline Reporting
Company ("ARC") automatically attempted to withdraw $11,000 from Mr. Fiet's bank
for airline tickets that Mr. Fiet had booked. R. 391: 389-90, 419. The ARC provides a
service to travel agencies who book airfare. When the ARC requested the funds that Mr.
Fiet owed, Mr. Fiet's bank informed the ARC that the account had insufficient funds. IcL
As a result, the ARC stopped its service with Mr. Fiet. IcL at 419. Also during this time,
Mr. Fiet failed to pay insurance companies for travel insurance that passengers had
purchased. Id. at 213, 218.
These facts provide conclusive evidence that Mr. Ison truthfully informed
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passengers that Mr. Fiet failed to forward cruise payments to NCL. Although Mr. Ison
did not speP

the source of each of the shortages detailed above, he accurately

informed passengers that Mr. Fiet had not sent money to NCL with which passengers had
entrusted him. Even the State concedes that Mr. Ison's defense is "plausible." State's
Brief at 35. This evidence proves that Mr. Ison not only had no intent to defraud
passengers, inchidiiig recklessness, but that he devised no scheme to defraud anyone.
The State's arguments that Mr. Ison devised a scheme to earn, higher commissions
and that Mr. Fiet did not "pocket[]ff passengers' payments are unsupported in light of the
evidence. State's Brief at 31-34. The evidence is undisputed that Mr. Fiet did not send
funds to NCL and that Mr. Ison needed thousands of dollars to pay for the missing
payments. In fact, the State concedes that Mr. Ison likely lust his ow n money in an effort
to complete the group booking. State's Brief at 9; R. 392: 502.
Moreover, it is irrelevant whether Mr. Fiet "pocketed" the passenger payments.
The issue for this case was whether Mr. Ison falsely communicated Mr. Fiet's action to
defraud passengers. The facts clearly show that he did not.
Likewise, the record supports Mr. Ison's claim that NCL "will not release any
cruise documents to Continental Travel until all funds due [NCL] have been received by
[NCL]." Appellant's Brief; Addendum O. Independent of Mr. Ison's testimony, Mr.
Lofthouse confirmed that failure to make up the deficits placed the entire group in
"jeopardy." R. 390: 220. According to Mr. Lofthouse's understanding, NCL "could
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hold the entire cruise documents on the entire group." Id. at 203. More specifically, Mr.
Lofthouse testified, consistent with Mr. Ison's representations, that Mr. Ison had to "fill
up a certain [funding] level before the documents, cruise documents, [would be]
released." R. 390: 221-22.
Mr. Mendez added that NCL strictly handled the group booking account. Mr.
Mendez testified that NCL ff[p]robably" would not have threatened to cancel the entire
group because it would be bad business to do so. R. 391: 328-29. Mr. Mendez did not
address, however, any threats to withhold cruise documents. In fact, he did not
personally deal with Mr. Ison because he had assigned Ms. Perez to handle the account.
Moreover, Mr. Mendez conceded that he had little recollection about the group booking.
He did remember reading an entry in NCL's telephone logs that NCL had threatened to
cancel the entire group if it did not receive payments for the total contract amount. R.
391: 328. Finally, Mr. Mendez conceded that NCL had threatened to cancel groups of
cabins for failure to pay the total contract amount. Id. at 329.
These facts reasonably imply that NCL had threatened not to release cruise
documents. Mr. Mendez's decision to restrict all leniency with Mr. Ison supports that
NCL had threatened to withhold documents. Importantly, Mr. Mendez never addressed
this key issue. Thus, it was impossible for the State to establish that Mr. Ison lied when
he informed passengers that NCL would not release cruise documents without additional
funds. In fact, given the clear contract provision allowing NCL to "automatically" cancel
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group bookings, Mr. Ison had more than reasonable grounds to warn passengers of this
possibility. He may have been derelict if he had not informed passengers of this fact
since they risked not sailing at all. Mr. Ison truthfully represented the facts.
Mr. Ison further acted properly in stating that Mr. Fiefs discount prices were not
"accurate" and that Arisocrat's contractual obligations were "null and void." Appellant's
Brief, Addendt1m O. Ihe inaccuracy correctly referred to Mr. Fiefs reduced
commissions. Although this reference may have been a shorthand description, it
constituted no scheme or intent to defraud. Moreover, as explained in section IC,
because Mr. Fiet failed to forward deposits, Mr. Ison never legally assumed
responsibility for the cruise, including any duty to honor Mr. Fiefs prices. See Grossen,
1999 UT App 167,1J12 n.5, 982 P.2d 581. Thus, Mr. Ison properly stated that his
agreement to assume responsibility for the cruise was void because of Mr. Fiefs actions.
The State's reiteration of Mr. Ison's failure to seek recission through mediation is simply
inapposite. State's Brief at 30-31. Mr. Ison had no intent to deceive when he described
Mr. Fiet's pricing as inaccurate and the purchase agreement as null iiiul \ nitl.
Finally, Mr. Ison did not misrepresent the facts when he asked Ms. Millyard to pay
NCL an additional $1,000. NCL's accounting log affirmatively establishes that even
though Mr. Fiet listed Ms. Millyard's and Ms. Field's names on the check lor % 1,000,
NCL never credited these passengers for the payn *.

- : ^cd them a cabin.

Appellant's Brief, Addenda Q; K at 4; R. 391: 322, 335-36; 392: 555-56. Rather, NCL

21

treated the check the same as other checks and applied the sum to the group account. As
confirmation of this fact, Mr. Mendez testified that the names would be "meaningless"
and that NCL's accounting department would have applied the check to the group
without crediting any specific passengers for the payment. R. 391: 428, 436.
When Mr. Ison contacted Ms. Millyard about the $1,000, he truthfully informed
her that NCL had not credited her for the payment. Because of Mr. Fiefs shortages on
this cruises as well as prior cruises, NCL took money from the group booking to pay for
debts unconnected to this cruise. Thus, when NCL credited the $1,000 check to the
group account and then transferred money out of the account to pay for Mr. Fiefs other
debts, Mr. Ison could not determine whose money NCL had taken from the account.
Further, because NCL had credited all checks to the group account and not to any
specific passengers, the absence of business records left Mr. Ison in the untenable
position of deciding which passengers should be credited and which should not.
When Mr. Ison asked Ms. Millyard to send NCL a credit card payment of $ 1,000
he truthfully stated that NCL had not credited her for the payment. Accordingly, he
advised Ms. Millyard to pay by credit card so NCL would be sure to assign her a cabin.
In doing so, he had no intent to defraud Ms. Millyard, otherwise, he would asked for
payment by check. Instead, Mr. Ison sought to ensure that Ms. Millyard traveled on the
cruise and that her money would not be misused for Mr. Fiefs shortages. Moreover, Mr.
Ison's wife testified that she too suggested that Ms. Millyard verify with NCL that she
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had not been credited for the payment. R. 391: 456-57. As a result, Ms. Millyard
telephoned NCL and paid the $1,000 by credit card the next day. R 411: 74; Appellant's
Brief, Addenda J at 10; K at 9.
At the very least, the evidence establishes that

v

)- *

- in good faith in all

of his representations. He investigated the facts extensively before requesting additional
sums, including conducting a through accounting, contacting NCL and Mr. Fiet, and
requesting Mr. Fiet to pay the money that he failed to forward to Nil

I fuse measures

eliminate any suggestion that Mr. Ison acted recklessly. Rather, he reasonably concluded
that Mr. Fiet was liable to passengers f< i (he shortages. Accordingly, he did what he
thought was best to maintain goodwill with passengers and to ensure that the group
sailed. As evidence of Mr. Ison's good faith, Mr. Ison gave up his own cabin, paid
$6,000 out of his own pocket, and suffered a loss for his efforts. At most, this close case
constituted a civil dispute over liability, not communications fraud.

III.

DEFENSE COUNSEL SUBJECTED MR.
ISON FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO AN
UNLAWFFT RESTITUTION AWARD.

Utah law did not authorize the trial judge to order Mr. Ison to pay Mr. Shupe and
Ms. Burback for their losses. Utah Code Annotated section 76-3-201(4)(a)(i) (1999)
requires trial judges to order restitution when a person is convicted of "criminal activity"
or a person agrees to pay restitution "as part of a plea agreement." Because Mr. Ison was
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convicted of a crime rather than pleaded guilty, he only owed restitution for his "criminal
activities]." Id Utah Code Annotated section 76-3-201(1 )(b) (1999) defines criminal
activities as "any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal
conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or
without an admission of committing the criminal conduct." See State v. Bickley, 2002
UTApp342,1J8,60P.3d582.
In arguing that persons are entitled to restitution whenever they suffer pecuniary
loss as a result of criminal activity, the State overlooks the statutory definition of
"criminal activity." State's Brief at 24-25. Because Mr. Ison has never admitted
responsibility for Mr. Shupe's and Ms. Burback's losses, the trial judge only had
authority to order restitution for offenses of which Mr. Ison was "convicted." Utah Code
Annotated § 76-3-20l(l)(b) (1999). Thus, contrary to the State's assertions, Mr. Ison
properly relies on State v. GallL 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998), State v. Mast. 2001 UT App
402, 40 P.3d 1143, and State v. Watson. 1999 UT App 273, 987 P.2d 1289, to support
his claim that he was not convicted for giving Mr. Shupe a less expensive cabin or for
failing to pay commissions to Ms. Burback. In all three of those cases, the courts
concluded that the trial judge had ordered restitution for conduct unrelated to the
defendants' convictions because, as here, the defendant was not "convicted" of criminal
conduct. Galli. 967 P.2d at 937; Mast. 2001 UT App 402, fl6, 40 P.3d 1143; Watson.
1999 UT App 273, ^[5, 987 P.2d 1289. Rather than imposing restitution for Mr. Ison's
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conviction, the trial judge improperly "nuuW inferences'' that Mr. Ison had committed
crimes with respect to the cabin assignment and commissions. Watson, 1999 UT App
273, \s, 987 P.2d 1289. Because Mr. Ison did not owe restitution to Mr. Shupe or Ms.
Burback, defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to these illegal restitution
awards.
The State erroneously asserts that Mr. Ison suffered no harm from these restitution
awards because he obtained a reduction to a misdemeanor based on his willingness to
pay restitution. State's Brief at 26-27. This argument ignores the fact that the trial judge
unlawfully ordered Mr. Ison to pay almost $1,300 in restitution. Presumably, the trial
court would have reduced Mr. Ison's conviction whether or not he had been ordered to
pay restitution to Mr. Shupe and Ms. Burback as long as he paid the amount of restitution
that he lawfully owed. Mr. Ison's reduction has no relevance to this issue.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Ison request this Court to reverse his convictions because tin State failed to
present evidence of guilt. At the very least, Mr. ison is entitled to a new trial to afford
him the right to effective counsel.

Submitted, this It* day of January, 2004.
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KENT&.HART
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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